CONNECTEDNESS AND ITS DISCONTENTS
DAN MARKEL t

In response to Wayne A. Logan, HorizontalFederalism in an Age of
CriminalJusticeInterconnectedness,154 U. PA. L. REV. 257 (2005).

I. CONSTRUCTING CRIMINAL HISTORY

Connectedness is actually a quandary. Often assumed to be a better state of affairs than being disconnected, the state of connectedness, upon closer examination, is not necessarily voluntary or desirable. Indeed, when E. M. Forster chose "Only connect .. ."as an
epigraph to his novel Howards End,' he surely wasn't thinking-it is
safe to say-of the kind of connectedness among polities that Professor Wayne Logan describes in his rich, measured, and illuminating article.i This should come as no surprise. Forster was exalting the
weightless energy of passionate encounter. Logan's research, by contrast, reveals the potential gloominess of connectedness.
By focusing on the legal implications of the migratory patterns of
criminal offenders, Logan's article asks two important questions that
have been given spare and insufficient attention. The first focuses on
how states construct the criminal histories of the offenders who are
now in their midst. The second asks what tradeoffs are implicated as
states make their choices regarding how to interpret the pasts of these
itinerant offenders as they relate to registration requirements or sentence enhancements for recidivism.
Answering the first question, Logan observes the existence of two
archetypal approaches a state might adopt when assessing an of-
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fender's prior record: an internal one and an external one.' Under
the internal aJ)proach, the use of "out-of-state convictions, and any
punishment resulting from those convictions, [must] satisfy the eligibility requirements of the forum state's registration or recidivist enhancement law." 4 On this view, for example, a state would not apply a
recidivist sentencing enhancement to an offender on the basis of a
conviction in another state for conduct that would not be illegal in the
forum state.5 By contrast, under the external approach, a forum state
faithfully implements the consequences of the legal judgments of its
fellow sovereign states, rather than re-examining those determinations
to see if the underlying circumstances (or length of sentence) would
have initiated the same legal consequences in the forum state. Consequently, with the external approach, an offender's former actions
potentially trigger a "marked trail" effect in the new forum state. Of
course, jurisdictions need not be consistent between recidivism and
registration requirements: some states might adopt, for instance, an
internal approach with respect to recidivist sentencing enhancements
but an external approach to sex offender registration laws.'
With respect to the second question regarding tradeoffs between
the approaches, Logan capably shows how both approaches raise difficult policy questions." Indeed, simply by ventilating the various issties as he does, Logan helpfully foregrounds many otherwise easily

3 Here I follow Logan's practice of collapsing the distinction between the
"strict
internal" and the "modified internal" approaches. Id. at 267-68. The basis for this elision is practical: theoretically, states might decide to take a "strict internal" approach,
by which they refuse to consider altogether a person's conduct or convictions that occurred out of state. See id. (noting that, by the mid 1970s, only Virginia had taken this
approach). The distinction between modified and strict internal approaches is purely
academic now, since, according to Logan's research, nojurisdiction employs the "inviting" strategy of a strict internal approach. See id.at 260 (noting that the strict internal
approach incentivizes prior offenders to emigrate); id. at 269 n.54, 276 n.92 (classitying every state's approach as either "modified internal" or "external"). Hence the "internal" approach described in the text's next sentence is actually a "modified internal
approach," but for shorthand's sake, I refer to it simply as the "internal" approach
hereinafter, unless otherwise specified.
4 Id. at 261.
) The "forum state," on Logan's account, is the state currently assessing whether
to
impose a sentence enhancement or registration requirement; the forum state can be
contrasted with the "foreign state," which is the prior state of residence and/or conviction. See id.at 266 n.41 (defining "foreign"jurisdictions as domestic jturisdictions other
than the forumjurisdiction).
Id.at 261.

Id. at 290 n.167 (discussing New York's use of the internal approach in some
contexts and the external approach in others).
7

s See id.at 292-329.
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obscured value trade-offs, and thus makes a profound contribution to
the study of federalism and American criminal law.t
This essay registers no real quarrel with Logan's analysis of the
scope and nature of criminal justice connectedness. My focus, instead, is on the normative argument in Logan's apparent preference
for the internal approach.I° I choose this focus not because I am convinced that the external approach is the obviously superior one.
Rather, I think Logan overestimates its deficiencies. The goal here,
then, is simply to adumbrate a few of the rejoinders available in defense of the external approach against Logan's criticisms. To the extent these responsive arguments are persuasive, then state courts
and/or legislatures will be in a better-informed position to select an
approach more consonant with their particular concerns and objectives. ''

II. THE EXTERNAL APPROACH'S HIDDEN VIRTUES
As alluded to above, Logan ultimately sides with the internal approach. This might seem odd as Logan himself recognizes several distinct advantages to the external approach. First, at least as compared
to the internal approach, the external approach advances judicial
economy, sparing courts the task and expense of comparing whether
the predicate conduct would satisfy the forumn state's eligibility requirenents for offender registration laws or sentence enhancements.1 2 Second, by serving judicial economy, the external approach

9 In addition to analyzing the ctrlicues of horizontal federalism,
Logan has re-

cently explored how the frderal government, by adopting a largely "external" approach,
"inflses federal law with the normative judgments of the respective states." Wayne A.

Logan, Creatinga "Hydra in Government": Federal Recourse to State Law in Crime tighting,
86 B.U. L. REv. 65, 67 (2006).
0 1 say "apparent" because Logan plays his (normative) cards close to his
vest in
this piece, at least until the end, where his antipathy for the external approach appears

more pronounced. See Logan, spna note 2, at 320-29.
1 At least until a coordination rule emerges that would mandate that all states
pick either the internal or the external approach. I leave for another day whether
such a hypothetical rule would, absent constitutional amendment, suvive litigation
challenges. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 & n.3 (1995) (noting traditional role of states in regulating crinrinaljustice matters).
12 Beai in mind that what I am calling the internal approach is
really the "modifled" internal approach. See surna note 3. The distinction is critical here because it
would be j ust as economical, indeed perhaps more so, to adopt the strict internal approach, since no inquiry into extraterritorial wrongdoing would be necessaiy at all.
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is capable of serving distributive justice goals as well, since a dollar
saved in administrative costs is a dollar available for helping other social projects. 3 Third, by giving effect to the prior judicial decisions
and legislative determinations of foreign states, the external approach
instantiates comity among the several states, evidencing respect for
the equal dignity of the states. " Fourth, the external approach is often the better vehicle for providing notice to a migrating offender.
Under the external approach, for example, the offender need only
know one set of laws regarding registration requirements-those of
the state in which she committed the offense. If states employ an internal approach, then migrant offenders will have greater difficulty in
keeping abreast of whether they are expected to register or not. Finally, the external approach is more likely to reinforce norms of individual responsibility and accountability, since it signals, as President
Clinton said, that if you break the law, "the law will follow you wherever you go-state to state, town to town." 15 In other words, if an offender must register in Alabama as a consequence of some crime she
committed there, she would not be able to escape those registration
requirements simply by moving to a different state, where the same
underlying conduct would have been perfectly legal.
Despite the variegated benefits of the external approach, Logan
condemns the external approach for four reasons: its harshness, its
creation of inequalities, its denigration of state autonomy, and, relatedly, its discouragement of jurisdictional competition for citizen mi1 On this point, Logan, supra note 2, at 294 n.183, refers us to Mitchell v. (reat
Works Milling & Mig. Co., 17 F. Cas. 496, 499 (C.C.D. Me. 1843) (No. 9,662), a case
where Justice Story denied the filing of federal suits in state court because such practices "may most materially interfere with the convenience of their own courts, and the
rights of their own citizens, and be attended with great expense to the state, as well as
great delays in the administration ofjustice." Of course, the distributive justice gains
in j tidicial economy are likely offset by the expenses associated with incarcerating offenders for longer periods of time for sentence enhancements; but the costs of these
longer sentences may, in turn, generate some benefits such as crime reduction
through incapacitation or general or specific deterrence.
14Michael O'Hear has suggested to me that the value of comity is oversold
here so
long as these registration requirements or recidivism enhancements are justified as
preventive measures. That is because, to the extent these provisions are imposed for
future social self-protection, only the legislated values of the (forum) state in which the
offender is currently living (or more likely to be committing an offense) should have
significance, and not the values embraced, potentially years ago, by another state. This
point is surely correct, but only so far as it goes. My sense is that these enhancements
or registration requirements are often added precisely to further punish (on the basis
of desert) the affected classes of offenders. When that's the case, comity could make
sense again.
1)Logan, supra note 2, at 261.
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gration. In what follows, I explain why these charges are overstated or
misplaced.
A.

Is the ExternalApproach Unduly Harsh?

To begin with, Logan notes that an embrace of the external approach can lead to the imposition of evermore onerous registration
requirements or sentence enhancements based on weird predicate
crimes or harsh procedural sorting rules that are extant in the several
states. 1c It may be true that, on the margins, the external approach
leads to more harm to defendants, 7 but Logan's article does not furnish us with enough evidence to believe that is conclusively the case,
as there are a variety of circumstances in which the internal approach
may lead to worse outcomes for migrant offenders. For example, forum states may have a lower bar for registration requirements than
foreign states; thus, out-of-state conduct that may be deemed relatively
benign in the foreign state may prompt severe consequences once the
migrant offender moves to the forum state. 8 Indeed, as Logan himself notes, the external approach would lead to better circumstances
for offenders on those occasions where "a crime classified as a misdemeanor in a foreign state can be treated by the forum as a felony for
purposes of assessing recidivism, or the foreign state would not count

16See, e.g., People v. Mazzie, 358 N.Y.S.2d 307, 311-12 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (noting that
under an external approach, NewYork would have to extend felony enhancements for
those "convicted of fornication in Alabama, seduction in Texas, blasphemy in NewJersey, vagrancy in Rhode Island, or of stealing a libraiy book in North Carolina or a tuikey in Arkansas" (citations omitted)); Mitchell v. State, 467 A.2d 522, 533 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1983) (noting that the legislature did not intend to impose a mandatory
sentence because of a prior conviction for "[c] utting cacti in California, uprooting the
state flower (rhododendron) in West Virginia, or desecrating a confederate cemetery
in Mississippi"). Logan appears to share these concerns. See Logan, supra note 2, at
303 ("[T]he notable idiosyncrasies of state laws are permitted to affect outcomes in
other states. For instance, if an individual moves from South Carolina to one of the
fifteen other states using an external test for registration, the Palmetto State's unusually broad gamut of registerable offenses will come into play....").
17 The empirical determination would ultimately
depend not only on the number
of states adopting the internal approach, but also on the number of cases heard by
each state.
is Logan, supra note 2, at 301; see also id. at 305 n.256 (discussing lendix v. Taylor,
579 S.E.2d 320, 325 (S.C. 2003), in which the forum state required an immigrant, under the internal approach, to register for life, even though the foreign state's registation requirements would have ended after five years).
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deferred or probated adjudications, or a nolo contendere plea, or a
priorjuvenile disposition."9
Even if it could be shown that the external approach is a net detriment to defendants because it tends to widen the scope of penality,
this is not always bad. For one thing, take note that the democratic
weirdness of federalism's fifty labs approach may cut in many directions. One need only imagine that the forun state adopts the internal
approach and also fails to recognize the crime of marital rape, or refuses to impose higher penalties for racially-motivated assaults or driving under the influence. Shorter criminal codes (and sentences) are
not inexorably better criminal codes (and sentences). Consequently,
when offenders move to an internal approach jurisdiction, there is a
decent chance that the resulting outcomes will offend, rather than reflect, progressive political sensibilities in the forum state because the
criminal codes of foreign states may actually serve retributive (or
other) ends more effectively than those of the forum state.
In this regard, by giving effect to the "marked trail" of an offender's conduct through the external approach, a forum state may in
fact be able to better conduct comparative experiments in crime policy than they otherwise would be able to perform.
Of course, this
would raise, albeit in a different way, Logan's pronounced concern
that the external approach entails a basic unfairness by treating similarly situated offenders differently.
This concern warrants careful
scrutiny.
B. Does the ExternalApproach PromoteInequality?
Logan's basic point about unequal treatment resulting from the
external approach is that "[w]hen forum states defer to outcomes
reached in foreign states with significant variations in substantive laws,
punishments, and procedural rights, otherwise similarly situated individuals can be treated unequally."2 2 To see how this works, consider
two types of inequality under the external approach that Logan espies:
The first [unequal treatment] involves immigrants from states with narrower registration eligibility criteria; they, unlike the immigrant from,
say, South Carolina, will not be subject to registration because it was not

Logan, supra note 2, at 301 (citations omitted).
For example, states could track recidivism rates of offenders with similar offenses but different penalties that result from application of the external approach.
1

20

21

ld. at 303.

22 Id.
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required by the foreign state from which they migrated. The second
arises when an offender in the forum state is not required to register as a
result of being convicted of an offense (e.g., peeping), yet the newcomer
is so required, again because of the idiosyncratic nature of the foreign
state's registration law. Alternatively, the duration of registration can be
made lengthier for newcomers if the forum state ties the newcomer's period of registration to the duration imposed by the state left behind. In
each such situation, registration, with its direct and collateral burdens
(including possibly community notification, with its litany of negative
consequences), is driven by the geographic happenstance of where the
foreirn conviction occurred, leading to unequal outcomes in the forum
state.
To be sure, unequal treatment of similarly situated offenders
should give us pause-as a normative and constitutional matter .2 But
the unequal treatment resulting from adoption of the external approach is not necessarily "unwarranted" or "unfair" if it doesn't involve offenders who are actually similarly situated. Logan's first scenario compares immigrants from different states who arrive in the
same new forum state; one is susceptible to more onerous registration
requirements while another is not, merely because of where the foreign conviction occurred. According to Logan, this disparity is troublesome, as is the resulting disparity between the immigrant offender
and the native offender in the second scenario.
Both scenarios, however, present only the veneer of unfairness.
Upon scrutiny, the unequal treatment dissolves simply by recourse to
the very point about notice that Logan acknowledges elsewhere. In
the case of the two immigrant offenders now in the forum state, it
makes little sense to think that they are similarly situated if they committed their offenses in different states against different sovereigns.
The same holds for the comparison of the perpetrator of an offense in
jurisdiction X to the perpetrator of the same offense in jurisdiction Y.
These offenders are not similarly situated precisely because the predicate conduct was perpetrated against different sovereigns whose democratic institutions may legitimately issue different rules with different

I. at 304-05.
See Dan Markel,Jennifer M. Collins & EthanJ. Leib, Ciminal juslice and the Challenge qf' atnily Ties, 2007 U. ILL. L. REv. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript on file with
the author) (arguing that disparate treatment of similarly situated offenders creates
"gashes in the moral fabric of impartial jstice"); Dan Markel, Luck or Law? The Constitutional Case Against Indeterminate Sentencing Schemes, 8-9 (Aug. 27, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author) (arguing that certain discretionary sentencing schemes are unconstitutional).
2,

24
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consequences."' This matters because, in a federal scheme of decentralized democracy, an offense of drug possession in state X may reasonably be regarded as having a different valence than those schemes
criminalizing drug possession in state y.
(Of course, we might not
like all the laws resulting from the plural nature of the states, but this
calls, perhaps, for increased constitutional regulation of criminal law
legislation, not an abandonment of federalism as such.) Moreover,
given the variety of ways in which similar acts committed in different
states may reveal different attitudes about criminal propensities, there
is further reason for thinking that the offenders in Logan's two scenarios are not similarly situated-though of course, this would depend
on the assumption that the offenders had knowledge of these varying
penalties.
In short, to generate a legitimate inference of unwarranted disparity, one has to treat differently two similarly situated perpetrators of
the same offense in the same jurisdiction. Both of Logan's two scenarios don't present that prerequisite. Indeed, when a forum state effectuates the consequences that would be visited upon an offender had
she remained in the foreign state-by adoption of the external approach-the forum state is actually serving the cause of equality because it ensures that similarly situated defendants convicted in the
same jurisdiction endure the same kind of consequences, regardless if
one of the offenders decides to go to another jurisdiction. More importantly, no unfairness or surprise to the offender can be claimed
because she is (presumptively) on notice from the outset; she is simply
receiving under the external approach what 7she would otherwise have
received had she stayed in the foreign state. 9

2) One might still venture that Logan's hypothetical scenarios present
the apearance of inequality, which could undermine popular support for the criminal law. See,
e.g.,
Paul H. Robinson &John M. Darley, The Utility
qfDeser, 91 Nw.U.L. REv. 453, 476
(1997) (explaining that social groups more likely flout a particular prohibition if the
overall legal system has a bad reputation). But in the context of the choice between
the external and internal approach, I doubt the "appearances of inequality" here will
mobilize massive resentment of the system at large.
26 See Ewing v.California, 538 U.S. 11, 24-25 (2003) (emphasizing the tradition of
judicial deference to legislative crime-control strategies).
27 For these reasons, states adopting the external approach would have little
difficulty in justifying these "disparate tieatments" under the Equal Protection Clause's rational basis test.
And the constitutional challenges brought so far have failed for
these or other reasons. See Logan, supra note 2, at 311 & n.287 (discussing failtue of
challenges to West Virginia and New York laws).
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C. Does the ExternalApproach Undermine State Autonomy?
In addition to his concerns about widening penality and inequality, Logan also fears the external approach leads to the erosion of
autonomy in individual states. This erosion of self-government occurs
on account of the ossification effects resulting when states, through
the external approach, "replicate temporally and geographically contingent aspects of substantive criminal law, punishment, and procedure. " s Logan thinks these "frozen-in-amber" effects are more pronounced in jurisdictions employing the external approach because,
under the internal approach, such "intergenerational drift" might be
checked by the forum state's own substantive rules and procedural requirements.29 There are two reasons to hesitate before condemning
these replication and ossification effects. First, as shown earlier, because the internal approach is not always less harsh and because
criminal codes in the foreign state may be more "progressive," 30 the
replication and ossification created by the external approach might
not be bad for defendants or society.
Second, and more relevant to the autonomy erosion claim, there
are two reasons states may see their choice of the external approach as
an expression of their autonomy, rather than as a denigration of it.
First, a state may view its choice of the external approach as saying to
an offender something like: "if you made the choice to violate the
criminal law of another state, we have a concern you might do so here
as well, even though what you did there would not have been a violation here." Thus, a state might self-consciously try to enhance its
crime reduction strategy against specific threats by adopting the ex31
ternal approach.
Second, notwithstanding its "right to act autonomously and independently, free of the constraining authority of other
governmental units," a state might adopt the external approach because it wants to see its norms adhered to when its offenders migrate
to other states. If the state sees itself in an iterative process by which it
believes that other states will reciprocate with adoption of the external
approach, then its choice to embrace the external approach will make
sense. To illustrate: State X might be willing to give effect to State Y's
laws to offenders whose crimes were prosecuted in State Y if State X
Id. at 307.
Ld.at 308.
?10See sutpra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
31 Thanks toJ.B. Ruh] for this point.
,2 Logan, supra note 2, at 324.
28

9
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thinks that State Y (or States A through W) will adopt and abide by the
external approach. That's because State X believes that in subsequent
cases, those states will give effect to State X's laws to former Xconvicted offenders who migrate to these other states.
Indeed, State X might try to persuade other states to adopt an external approach so that they give effect to State X's legislative views on
offenders previously convicted in State X. Though they have no
power to mandate the extraterritorial application of their laws, the
states employing the external approach might try to convince the "internal approach" states that they are acting as "free-riders." They are
free-riders because internal approach states have their laws apply in
their own jurisdiction to indigenous and imnmigrant offenders and
they also have their laws apply to their own former citizens who migrate to external aJ)proach states. Without a rule mandating one approach or another, internal approach states are able to enjoy a kind of
law-hoarding, thereby undermining norms of reciprocity.
There is a solution available to bring this "game" to equilibrium:
states that care about this problem could use a bifurcated strategy.
The courts in the forum state could apply the external approach to
offenders from other external approach states while using the internal
approach against offenders migrating from internal approach states.
But the fact that such a strategy is not used indicates that this unfairness is either deemed relatively insignificant or that the unfairness has
not been made obvious to relevant policymakers.
D.

Does the ExternalApproach DiscourageDemocratic Experimentalism and
JurisdictionalCompetition?

Logan concludes his critique of the external approach by contending that states that adopt the internal approach are better able to
serve as "stalwarts of 'fifty-labs' federalism." 33 1 find this claim puzzling. To begin with, a state adopting the external approach is at least
equally able to convey its respect for fifty-labs federalism precisely because it may doggedly apply its own laws to offenders who commit
crimes in that state while at the same time demonstrating equal respect for the dignity of its sister states by implementing the laws of its
sister states on their migrant offenders. Pace Logan, the external approach poses no real jeopardy to the spirit of democratic experimentalism-after all, the proportion of migrant offenders is likely to be

Id. at 318.
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small compared to the number of indigenous offenders, so lawmakers
will not likely be deterred from trying to undertake criminal law innovations to see how they work.
Indeed, for the same reason, the risk attending Logan's fear that
the external approach prompts a slippage in democratic accountability34 seems remote. How many instances are there where someone
convicted of a weird crime in another state-Logan's examples are
adultery and peeping 5-has that offense later serve as a predicate to
enhanced sentences or registration requirements in a forum state
adopting the external approach? My guess is not that many. Unfortunately, Logan's article (quite reasonably) does not provide the empirics. But even if it were a non-trivial number, calling that result, as
Logan does, "stealth legislation""" is inapposite. After all, no citizens
of the forum state will face penalty enhancements for such conduct if
that conduct is committed in the forumn state.
As long as the forum state's citizens are free to engage in that
predicate conduct, then virtually no risk to Alexander Hamilton's vision of the states competing for the "people's 'affection"' materializes-because people are still able to make informed choices about
where to live ex ante-that is, before any crime is committed.' If I
want to move away from a state that makes peeping a felony, I can do
so at no penalty if I have not committed an offense. But Logan thinks
people should be able to commit an offense and then escape (some
of) the consequences of that conduct by moving to an "easier" place
to live. Certainly, offenders who serve their sentence and complete all
their conditions of release should enjoy the fruits of mobility associated with the American religion of self-reinvention.38 But by what
moral rights do they merit a free roaming pass prior to their release
from the criminal justice system? 39 It is unlikely this is the kind ofju-

See id. at 322-23.
Id. at 322.
3 Id. at 323.
37 See id. at 325 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO.
17, at 120 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)); see also Doion Teictnnan, The
nke fin C riminaljustice:
Federalism, (rme Corlol, aridJurisdictional Competitioni, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1831, 1835
(2005) (discussing the incentives for local communities to harshen their criminal justice systems in order to encourage offenders to migrate to otherjurisdictions).
(? . City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 53 (1999) ("We have expressly identified this 'right to remove from one place to another according to inclination' as 'an
attribute of personal liberty' protected by the Constitution." (quoting Williams v. Fears,
179 U.S. 270, 274 (1900)).
?1 See Snmith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 101 (2003) (noting that ex-offenders tinder su-
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risdictional competition Hamilton or other federalists had in mind.
Moreover, to the extent that internal approach states end up being
harsher on defendants,

then that too will deter migration on the

margins, thereby depriving "prospective state [s]" of "such persons'
talents and resources. 41 At the level of abstraction Logan has pitched
this inquiry, the selection of the internal approach over the external
approach can often cut both ways.
Finally, to the extent anyone in an external approach state is
troubled by the introduction of what Logan calls "stealth legislation, 4,
she might take comfort in knowing that her own state's weird legislation is being given effect in other external approach states. Logan
correctly worries that the external approach might give extended effect to laws like the ones invalidated in Lawrence v. Texas.'' But that is
just one side of the coin. The flip side is that progressive states might
be criminalizing marital rape, or making it easier to prosecute date
rape, and, through the external approach, they are seeing norms shift
in "better directions." And in both situations, criminal legislation is
policed, albeit too weakly, by the Constitution.' In the end, there is a

pervision are not "free to move where they wish and to live and work as other citizens"). Of course, this point is compatible with a belief that the criminal justice systems across the states have gone too far in intruding upon ex-offenders' lives. The
proper response to that problem, however, is broad-based democratic reforms of the
criminal justice system in the foreign state, not application of the internal approach to
those few migrant offenders affected in the forum state.
40 See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying
text.
41 Logan, supra note 2, at 326. One might wonder
whether use of the external approach implicates values such as an offender's fundamental right to travel. Although
this topic is well beyond the scope of this essay, it bears mention that the external approach hardly interferes with that right as such. It simply ensures that the migrant offender receives no particular benefit f-rom leaving the "foreign jurisdiction."
42 Id. at 323.
Logan seems worried that use of the external approach will mean
that a state can "effectively codify 'peeping' (South Carolina) or adulter y (Kansas) as
conxictions requiring registration" if it is fearful of legislating such requirements
through "the formal legislative process." Id. at 322. It seems just as plausible that, to
the extent that legislators are paying attention to these applications of the external approach in their jurisdiction, they would be spurred to repeal antiquated legislation that
might still exist on their books. More likely still is that all such signals fr-om the occasional case of the migrant offender fiom the "weird" state are far fiom the attention of
state legislators in external approach states. Finally, Logan's awareness of the costs of
such "stealth legislation," id. at 322 n.343, would countervail against these concerns
about democratic accountability.
4, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
44 E.g., id. at 578-79 (overturning criminal law prohibiting
consensual sodomy);
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989) (flag desecration); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 166-67 (1973) (abortion); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (public display of offensive words); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (miscegenation).
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quid pro quo among the external approach states-one that Logan
appears reluctant to acknowledge. And for those states that are still
worried about the injustices potentially worked by replicating weird
laws of other states, they have yet another strategy available to them:
employ the external approach generally while simultaneously carving
out specific safe harbors for particular conduct the legislature deems
worthy of protection. On this view, a legislature could cleanly direct
its courts to exclude from consideration those out-of-state convictions
arising from, say, consensual sodomy or growing marijuana for medicinal use.

III. FEARING DEMOCRACY?
In reviewing Logan's multiple concerns about the external approach, one might be tempted to view them as fragments of a larger
skittishness toward the work of democracies in the realm of criminal
law politics, and the purported crisis of overcriminalization produced
therefrom.'
To be sure, there is a basis for fearing incessant overcriminalization. But the claims of pernicious democratic pathologies
in criminal law politics are also prone to exaggeration, as Professor
Darryl Brown has recently demonstrated convincingly.
And to the
extent the crisis of overcriminalization is real, it probably does not
make much sense to seek its amelioration through choosing between

4I

am grateful to Ron Wright for this suggestion.

46 Professor Brown stummarized his
findings:

Legislatures routinely decline to enact bills proposing new crimes or increased punishments, for reasons familiar to students of legislative process....
[L]egislators also repeal longstanding criminal statutes, reduce punishments,
reduce offense severity, and occasionally convert low-level crimes to civil infractions ....
Moreover, interest groups and popular opinion often support
and sometimes drive de-criminalization reforms, which means both that democratic sentiment is not solely in favor of ever-increasing harshness and that
democratic processes can accurately respond to that sentiment-even when,
as in the case of consensual sex crimes, popular sentiment is not uniform.
Legislatures in fact criminalize relatively little conduct that most people think
should be completely unregulated, and they sometimes reduce punishments
even for widely supported offenses ....
Further, when legislatures leave outdated crimes on the books, other components of democratic process compensate: politically accountable prosecutors rarely prosecute (and thus effectively
nullify) many of the crimes scholars complain about.
Dairyl K. Brown, Tales ID emocra's Dyu t/,nc/Iont
Are (heally ExaggWaled: The Surprisingly
Ordina,y Politics ?f (rimial Law 3-4 (ExpressO Preprint Series, Paper No. 1523, 2006),
available at http://law.bepress.com/expiesso/eps/1523 (follow to "download the paper").
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the internal or external aJ)Jroach-sinJ)ly because there are far more
direct measures available.
In any event, whether one supports the external approach or not,
one can't help but be impressed by the tremendous service performed
by Logan's research and arguments. My dim hope is that this essay
has both shed some further light on the topic of conversation invaluably provoked by Professor Logan and shown that the case against the
external approach is not quite as forceful as it might seem at first
blush.

